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Abstract 
This  paper  attempts  to  investigate  whether  China’s  economic  reform  has 
improved enterprise performance, and what determine enterprise efficiency in 
the context of China’s transition. Contrast to the results of improving enterprise 
performance measured by TFP from other studies, this paper find that there is a 
general  tendency  of  divergence  of  enterprise  efficiency  rather  than  a 
convergence  of  firm’s  efficiency  as  is  expected  from  a  competitive  market. 
Similar  to  other  studies,  this  paper  has  also  confirmed  that  SOEs  are  less 
efficient than COEs.  
 
Why SOEs are less efficient, and how do Chinese firms respond to China’s 
gradual  economic  reform  and  increasing  market  competition?  Further 
econometric analysis suggests that firms of different ownership types seem to 
respond similarly to catch up with technology frontier, indicating that firms’ 
efficiency  gap  may  arise  from  their  historical  legacy;  enterprise  reform 
characterised by profit retention program have improved firms’ efficiency at the 
initial stage of reform, but this positive effect has been diminishing; market 
competition seems to be working, but ineffectively. 
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Has China’s Economic Reform Improved Enterprise Performance? A DEA 
Evaluation of China’s Large and Medium Enterprises 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
Since  the  launch  of  China’s  economic  reform  in  1978,  the  investigation  of 
whether  the  economic  reform  has  improved  enterprise  performance,  in 
particular performance of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and whether this 
improvement will be persistent has been a popular topic in the study of Chinese 
economic  reform.  To  the  extent  that  China’s  economic  reform  improves 
enterprise performance, it will provide useful academic and policy references to 
the reform in other transition and developing countries.  
 
But, the results from the mass researches on this topic are mixed. In fact, two 
contradictory  views  about  the  effect  of  China’s  economic  reform  on  SOE 
performance have emerged from the literature. One is that China’s economic 
reform has improved SOE performance, characterised by the increasing TFP 
since 1980s’ (Chen et al., 1998, Jefferson et al., 1996). The other, based on the 
declining of SOE profitability, is that economic reform has not improved SOEs’ 
performance,  and  SOEs  have  actually  become  a  destabilizer  for  the  whole 
economy (Sachs and Woo, 1997).  
 
However, neither productivity nor profitability is necessarily a good indicator of 
enterprise performance in transition economies. On one hand, Bai et al. (1996) 
suggested that improved productivity could possibly be an index of even lower 
economic  efficiency  given  significant  non-profit  objectives  of  SOEs.  They 
suggested that when the objectives of the manager differs from that of profit 
maximization, higher productivity can induce distorted behaviour that partially 
or totally offsets efficiency gains from improved technology
1.  On the other 
hand, the falling profitability  may result from the emergence of competition 
from the non-state enterprises, which is a desirable effect of economic reform 
(Naughton,  1995;  Jefferson  and  Rawski,  1994).  Moreover,  the  falling 
profitability could possibly be an artificial result due to expanded managerial 
autonomy. As when managers’ autonomy is expanded, managers have both the 
incentive and discretion to manipulate the financial account (Sicular, 1995).   
 
In order to assess accurately the effect of China’s enterprise reform, there is 
clearly a need to measure enterprise performance in a more robust way. As 
efficiency improvement is a major objective of economic reform, is considered 
a survival condition for firms in a competitive environment, and is central to 
firm’s long term growth (Bain, 1969). In this paper Data Envelopment Analysis   2
is applied first to Large and Medium enterprises, of which SOEs dominate and 
where the Chinese enterprise reform have focused on, from a Chinese Province 
to  calculate  directly  enterprise  efficiency  and  to estimate  whether  enterprise 
performance, in terms of efficiency, has been improved or not. In addition to 
these,  this  paper  also  tries  to  investigate  the  effects  of  Chinese  economic 
reforms upon enterprise efficiency and how firms respond to changing markets. 
 
This paper is organised as follow, in section 2 the concept of efficiency and the 
efficiency measurement used in this chapter are introduced; In section 3, the 
data used in the study is described. In section 4, the estimations of DEA and 
Malmquist index are implemented and the results are reported. In Section 5, a 
number  of  mechanisms  by  which  enterprise  efficiency  can  be  improved  are 
discussed, and a panel data regression model is used to estimate the effect of 
economic reform, market competition, and ownership upon firms’ efficiency 
index estimated in section 4. In section 6, a dynamic panel data analysis is 
applied  to  study  the  dynamic  process  of  firms’  strive  to  catch  up  with 
technology frontier. The final section concludes.  
 
2.  Concept of Efficiency and Efficiency Measurement  
 
(1) Concept of Efficiency 
 
The efficiency of a production unit is defined as the ratio of observed to optimal 
values of its output and input. The comparison can take the form of the ratio of 
observed to maximum potential output obtainable from the given input, or the 
ratio  of  minimum  potential  to  observed  input  required  producing  the  given 
output. Productive efficiency of a firm consists of two components: technical 
efficiency, which reflects the ability of a firm to obtain maximal output from a 
given set of inputs, and allocative efficiency, which reflects the ability of a firm 
to  combine  the  inputs  and  the  outputs  in  optimal  proportions,  given  their 
respective prices.  
 
Farrell  (1957),  who  drew  upon  the  work  of  Debreu  (1951)  and  Koopmans 
(1951), introduced a measure of technical efficiency, which is defined as one 
minus the maximum equiproportionate reduction in all inputs that still allows 
continued production of given outputs. If prices are available, Lovell (1993) 
proved that a measure of economic efficiency (cost efficiency) can be provided 
by  the  ratio  of  minimum  cost  to  observed  cost  given  the  objective  of  the 
production  unit  is  cost  minimisation,  thereafter  a  measure  of  allocative 
efficiency can also be calculated by the ratio of economic efficiency to technical 
efficiency.    3
 
This idea can be illustrated in simple firms using two inputs 
2 1,x x  to produce a 
single output q. The unit isoquant of the efficient firms is represented by  AA in 
Figure  4.1,  and  assumes  constant  returns  to  scale.  It  shows  various 
combinations of inputs producing a unit level of output.  
 

















A  producer  is  said  to  be  technically  efficient  if  production  occurs  on  the 
boundary of producer’s production possibilities; it is technically inefficient if 
production occurs in the interior of the production possibilities set. The term 
technical inefficiency  is  used to embrace all  reasons  for  actual performance 
falling short of that which could be attained given inputs.  
 
In Figure 1, the input price is represented by the line  BB, so that the allocative 





The  economic efficiency  is defined as a  product of technical  and allocative 
efficiency, which is the overall cost of producing at Q relative to P. 









The concept of efficiency is closely linked with the issue of productivity. The 
productivity of a firm is generally defined as the ratio of the outputs that it 
produces  to  the  inputs  that  it  uses.  Rising  productivity  implies  either  more 
product is produced with the same amount of inputs, or that less inputs are 
required to produce the same level of output, hence rising efficiency and the 
outward shift of a production frontier always imply productivity growth.  
 
Productivity change generally encompasses: technical change (an outward shift 
in the firm’s production frontier), and change in the return to scale (a movement 
along  the  firm’s  production  surface),  and  change  in  productive  efficiency 
(Leibenstein’s (1966) X-efficiency) , which can be further divided into technical 
efficiency (a movement towards or away from the firm’s production frontier) 
and allocative efficiency (S.Grosskopf, 1993; Lovell, 1993; and Diewart, 2000).  
 
(2) Data Envelopment Analysis: a Method of Efficiency Measurement 
 
Economic  efficiency  has  been  estimated  based  on  two  frontier  models: 
stochastic  frontier  and  non-stochastic  frontier.  Econometric  approaches  and 
mathematics programming approaches have been used to estimate these two 
frontiers respectively.  
 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is the most frequently used mathematical 
programming  approach.  This  approach,  proposed  by  Charnes,  Cooper  and 
Rhodes (1978), involves the use of linear programming methods to construct a 
non-parametric piece-wise surface (or frontier) over the data, and against which 
the efficiency is measured. It is a generalisation of the Farrell (1957) single-
input/single-output  efficiency  measures  to  the  multiple-output  case  by 
constructing a relative efficiency score as the ratio of single virtual output to 
single virtual input. 
 
In DEA, there are n Decision Making Units (DMU) to be evaluated, each DMU 
use different amounts of  minputs to produce  sdifferent outputs. DEA try to 
identify  which  of  the  n  DMU  can  determine  an  envelopment  surface.  This 
envelopment  surface  is  called  empirical  production  function  or  the  efficient 
frontier. So by comparing each DMU to the envelopment surface, the relative 
efficiency score are calculated. Units lie on the surface are efficient, those do 
not lie on the surface are inefficient. 
    5
The basic idea of Charnes et al. (1978) is that each DMU should be allowed to 
adopt  a  set  of  weights  which  shows  it  in  the  most  favourable  light  in 
comparison to the other units.  
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Where ( ) , i i y x  is the input output vector to be evaluated,  ) , ( j j y x  is the input 
output  vector of the jth  production unit  in  the sample.  And  this  measure is 
estimated by solving  N  linear programs for each technology satisfying either 
constant returns to scale, non-increasing returns to scale or variable returns to 
scale. 
 
The  calculation  of  technical  efficiency  and  scale  efficiency  is  illustrated  in 
Figure 2. 
 












CRS: Constant Return Of Scale;   
VRS: Variant Return of Scale
 
The technical efficiency of  K  in the case of CRS is 
HK
HI . In the case of VRS,   6
technical efficiency is 
HK
HJ , and scale efficiency is 
HJ








HI =TEvrs*Scale Efficiency 
 
 
DEA has several advantages for this study:   
 
First,  it  places  no  restrictions  on  the  functional  form  of  the  production 
relationship, more than one production function is admitted. It is more flexible 
in recognizing differences in production functions between DMUs.This is an 
advantage for the study on transition economies, as one of the assumptions for 
production function selection is perfect market competition, which is absent in 
transition economies. 
 
Second, it deals with individual units rather than population average. DEA is 
oriented  toward  individual  decision-making  units  which  are  regarded  as 
responsible for utilizing inputs to produce the outputs of interest. It therefore 
utilizes n optimizations, one for each DMU, rather than the single optimization 
that is usually associated with the regressions used in econometric efficiency 
analyses. Hence, the DEA solution is unique for each DMU under evaluation. 
 
Third, it focuses on revealing the best practice production frontier rather than on 
the  general  tendency.  DMUs  are  directly  compared  against  a  peer  or  a 
combination of peers. And for each production unit, a single efficiency index to 
measure the utilisation of inputs to produce desired outputs is produced, which 
makes possible the following econometric analysis (Charnes et al., 1994). 
 
Fourth, DEA provides both the sources (input and output) and amounts of any 
inefficiency. A deficiency of the econometric approaches is their inability to 
identify sources and estimate the inefficiency amounts associated with these 
sources.  Hence,  no  clue  as  to  corrective  action  is  provided  even  when  the 
inefficiencies are present.  
 
The same characteristics that make DEA a useful tool can also create problems. 
It is deterministic and only gives point estimates that do not provide information 
about uncertainty in estimation, and the estimation depends heavily upon the 
correctness of frontier units, measurement error can cause significant problems. 
Since  DEA  is  a  nonparametric  technique,  statistical  hypothesis  tests  are 
difficult. Simar (1996) proposed a bootstrap procedure as a solution to perform 
the desired inference in DEA-models.    7
(3) Measurement of Productivity Change: Malmquist Index 
 
In order to measure the change of technological productivity, Malmquist firm-
specific productivity indexes were introduced by Caves, Christen, and Diewert 
(1982).  And  Fare,  Grosskopf,  Lindgren  and  Ross  (1989)  made  use  of  the 
Geometric mean of the two output based Malmquist indexes defined by the 
above researchers to yield the Malmquist measure of productivity.   
 
Fare et al (1994) defines an output based Malmquist productivity change index 
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where  the  notation  ) , ( t t
s
o y x d   represents  the  distance  from  the  period  t 
observation  to  the  period  s  technology.  Malmquist  index  represents  the 
productivity change of the production point  ) , ( t t y x  relative to the production 
point  ). , ( s s y x .  
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this  decomposes  the  Malmquist  output-oriented  productivity  index  into  the 
product of two terms. The first term is the ratio of two technical efficiency 
indexes from periods t and  s, which indicates whether the technical efficiency 
has improved or not. The second term is a geometric mean of the shifts in the 












































y x d  
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This  decomposition  is  illustrated  in  Fig.  3  where  a  constant  return  to  scale 
technology  involving  a  single  input  and  a  single  output. 
t F   and 
s F   are 
production frontiers in period  t and  s respectively. The Firm produces  ) (
t t x y  
and  ) (
s s x y  respectively in periods t ands. In each period, the firm is operating 
below the technology for that period.   
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3.  Data 
 
The data used in this study is an unbalanced panel data from a Northern Chinese 
province, Liaoning, covering all the large and medium industrial enterprises in 
this  province.  These  enterprises  includes  various  ownership  forms,  various 
administration  structure,  and  distributes  in  various  industrial  sectors  for  the 
period of 1987-1996, a period when the economic reform gradually transited 
from ‘crossing the river by groping the stone’ to establishing market economic 
system,  and  the  SOE  reform  gradually  changed  from  expanding  managerial 
autonomy and allowing profit sharing to establishing modern enterprise system 
and large scale privatisation of small SOEs.  
 
Liaoning province is the sixth largest province in China in terms of GDP, and is 
an area where the central planning system has perhaps most deeply rooted.  It 
used to be the centre of China’s manufacturing industry, its industrial output 
accounted for more than one tenth of the total industry output in China, and the 
number of large and medium sized State Owned Enterprises in this province 
account  for  one  tenth  of  the  number  of  large  and  medium  state  owned 
enterprises in China. The foundation of Liaoning’s industrial structure was laid 
down in China’s first five-year plan period (1952-1957), and was characterised 
by heavy industry and huge SOEs. Before 1979, gross industrial output from 
heavy industry accounted for more than 80% of the provincial gross industrial 
output,  and  gross  industrial  output  from  large  and  medium  enterprises 
accounted  more  than  60%  of  provincial  gross  industrial  output.  The  most 
famous  case  of  large  SOE  in  Liaoning is  Anshan  Steel and  Iron Company, 
which had long been the biggest enterprise in China before 1995, and workers 
employed by which typically accounted for 15% of the urban population of 
AnShan city where the company located.  
 
Historically, the economy in this province to some extent is a snapshot of the 
entire Chinese economy. Compared with China in general, Fig. 4 shows that 
SOE share of Gross Output in Liaoning Province shows a similar declining 
tendency,  and  Fig.  5  shows  that  the  GDP  growth  rate  in  Liaoning  has 
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Liaoning province has been a pioneer in several reform initiatives, for example 
the first case of bankruptcy and the first case of Shareholding Company all 
occurred  here,  recently  the  reform  of  social  security  system  are  being   11
experimented in large scale in this province. This province has 14 cities, five of 
them are coastal cities; one of these latter - Da Lian - was one of the earliest 
cities to have been opened up to the outside world. Now it is here the problems 
of state owned enterprises are the most serious and it is here that the Chinese 
Government  wants  to  make  a  breakthrough  in  the  reform  of  state  owned 
enterprises.  
 
In  the  process  of  reform,  this  province  has  also  shown  some  common 
marketisation characteristics of the whole economy. Table 1 below shows the 
similarity of the provincial marketisation to that of the national economy. The 
table gives a few indicators of the degree of marketisation of China’s regions. 
From this table, we can also see that Liaoning to some extent on the on the 
national average degree of marketisation. It has the lowest multinational share, 
the highest state-owned share and the highest wage premium among provinces 
with open costal cities or special economic zones (SEZ), and its import share 
and  tariff  level  are  below  the  group  average.  However,  compared  with  the 
averages  in  provinces  not  including  “open  Coastal  Cities”  or  SEZ,  the 
multinational share and wage premium are higher, the state owned share and 
tariffs are lower, the import share is smaller than only three provinces in this 
group.   12
 
Table 1: Selected Data from China’s Regions in 1995 








Premium  Tariffs 
Beijing  1909  0.215  0.555  0.075  0.366  0.413 
Tianjin  2094  0.240  0.284  0.430  0.522  0.306 
Include “Open Coastal Cities” or SEZ (Group II) 
Liaoning  4975  0.042  0.389  0.022  0.475  0.227 
Hebei  3996  0.066  0.327  0.007  0.360  0.289 
Shandong  8456  0.054  0.274  0.007  0.308  0.282 
Jiangsu  11813  0.102  0.176  0.008  0.353  0.223 
Shanghai  5129  0.290  0.294  0.080  0.452  0.163 
Zhejiang  8088  0.075  0.082  0.010  0.270  0.240 
Fujian  2801  0.270  0.068  0.035  0.387  0.298 
Guangdong  9535  0.271  0.000  0.075  0.330  0.215 
Guangxi  1666  0.065  0.357  0.014  0.357  0.252 
Hainan  193  0.204  0.054  0.348  0.436  0.172 
Average  5665  0.144  0.202  0.061  0.373  0.236 
Do Not include “Open Coastal Cities” or SEZ (Group III) 
Average  1736  0.035  0.551  0.028  0.418  0.214 
Notes: 
1. Table 1 is extracted from Branstetter and Feenstra (1999) 
2. SEZ: Special Economic Zone 
3. Output is measured in 100 million RMB, where 8 RMB»$1. Multional share, State 
owned share and Import shares are the shares of domestic spending on multionals, 
state  owned  enterprises  and  imports.  The  wage  premium  equals  wages  paid  by 
multinationals minus that in urban collectives, divided by that in multinationals.  
 
Arguably  therefore,  the  enterprise  reforms  in  this  province,  especially  the 
reform of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), are a representative of the enterprise 
reform in China’s manufacturing sector more generally.   
   
In this study we use data from large and medium enterprises from Liaoning 
province to study the effect of enterprise reform, as the reform of large and 
medium SOEs is the focus of the reform of SOEs. In China, enterprise’s size is 
classified according to criteria put forward in 1988 and amended in 1992 by 
National  Economic  and  Trade  Committee,  National  Planning  Committee, 
National Statistics Bureau, National Financial Ministry and National Personnel 
Ministry. According to this criteria, enterprises can be classified into Extremely 
Large, Large I, Large II, Medium I, Medium II and Small Enterprises according 
to their productive capacity and/or productive fixed assets. For example, in Iron 
and Steel Industry, enterprises are classified according to their Steel Production 
capacity and/or their productive fixed asset. See the table below: 
   13
Table 2: Enterprise Size Classification Criteria for Iron and Steel Industry 
  Extreme 
Large 
Large I  Large II  Medium I  Medium II  Small 





0.6  -  1 
million 
tons 
0.3  -  0.6 
million 
tons 








>1  billion 
Yuan RMB 
         
 
Each year, enterprises can apply to upgrade their classification as long as they 
have reached the required standards. Therefore, this data set is dynamic and 
unbalanced.    
  
Most of the large and medium enterprises are SOEs, however the share of SOEs 
is decreasing. In 1987, 87.5% of large and medium enterprises are SOEs; this 
share decreases to 66.4% in 1996. The share of COEs has been relatively stable 
at around 15%. The number of non-public large and medium enterprises has 
increased rapidly from 1 in 1987 to 286 in 1996.  
 













1987  784  686  97  1  0  0  -------- 
1988  812  688  121  2  1  0  -------- 
1989  938  782  149  4  3  0  -------- 
1990  970  806  153  5  6  0  -------- 
1991  1054  866  169  0  14  5  -------- 
1992  1258  1012  224  1  16  5  -------- 
1993  1315  1020  182  47  36  5  25 
1994  1318  952  188  42  69  20  47 
1995  1559  1052  241  31  128  45  62 
1996  1488  988  214  27  130  61  68 
 
Similar to the picture of  manufacturing enterprises at the national level, the 
performance  of  these  enterprises  have  also  shown  the  trends  of  declining 
profitability  and  rapidly  increasing  labour  productivity,  see  Fig.  6.  For  the 
period between 1987 and 1996, labour productivity has more than doubled, but 
profit sale ratio has declined from around 12% to less than 3%.  
   14
Figure 6: Rising Labour Productivity (1987=100) and Declining Profitability 





























































4.  Efficiency and Productivity: DEA and Malmquist Analysis 
 
In this section, efficiency index and Malmquist productivity index are estimated 
for  each  enterprise  for  over  10  years,  the  average  efficiency  index  and 
Malmquist index are reported, and the features of the frontier firms will be 
discussed.  
 
(1) Input and Output Variables  
 
There are five main variables involved in the estimation, four input variables: 
labour,  fixed  capital,  current  capita,  intermediate  inputs,  and  one  output 
variable: industrial output. The definitions of the variables are defined in the 
following: 
 
Industrial  Output: I  use gross value of industrial output  (GVIO)  in  current 
prices as the measure of industrial output. This is a more appropriate measure 
than value-added, as value added can take negative values which is not allowed 
in DEA. However, this measure also has its problems. For instance, due to the 
government regulation of strategic important industries, the prices of important 
products, such as coal, iron and steel, and oil etc., have long been subject to 
state controls and been set lower than market prices, hence using gross value as 
the output measure of these products may underestimate the efficiency of firms   15
in  these  industries.  Another  problem  associated  with  using  gross  value  of 
industrial  output  is  that  emphasising  output  maximization  deviates  from  the 
market-oriented objectives of economic reform. In order to solve this problem, 
we include both intermediate inputs and current capital as inputs, as the unsold 
products are recorded as inventory, a component of current asset, according to 
China’s accounting practice.  
 
Labour  (including  production  workers,  technicians,  and  management):  the 
yearly average number of employees, which captures the employment situation 
through the whole year rather than just year-end employment situation, is used 
in this study. But the data does not distinguish between production workers, 
researchers and management. In general, large SOEs have the highest ratio of 
management  to  production  workers.  TVEs  and  Private  Enterprises  have  the 
lowest management- production ratio.  
 
Fixed Assets: Fixed assets consist of two components: productive assets and 
non-productive  assets,  both  measured  at  their  historical  prices.  Productive 
capital  includes  infrastructures,  machinery  and  equipment  for  industrial 
production,  whereas non-productive capital  refers  to  apartment buildings  for 
employees, hospitals, and sometimes even schools.  
 
Current Assets: Current assets are the capital that can be consumed or refunded 
in  a  year  or  in  an  operating  cycle,  including  product  inventory,  short-term 
investment, etc. For all enterprises, both year-end value of current capital and 
annual average value of current capital have been recorded.  Here I use the 
annual average current capital to capture the characteristics of current capital in 
a whole year.  
 
Intermediate input: Intermediate inputs are measured as values in current value. 
Intermediate inputs in general include raw materials, energy, depreciation, and 
other material consumption.  
 
As  DEA  is  carried  out  in  a  single  time  period,  therefore  measuring  gross 
industrial output, fixed capital, current capital and intermediate inputs in current 
prices is  not a  problem. However, in  order to  calculate  a  Malmquist index, 
which estimates the change of efficiency and the shift of production frontiers 
over  time,  these  variables  have  to  be  deflated.  As  a  Malmquist  Index  is 
estimated for a firm over two consecutive years in this study, inputs and output 
are only deflated to the previous year’s price level. For fixed assets, only the 
new investments are deflated. The fixed asset deflator can be found from the 
Statistical Yearbook of China. The intermediate input deflator can also be found   16
from the same source. For current assets, due to its mobility, the inflation rate is 
used as the deflator. For Gross Value of Industrial Outputs (GVIO), we have the 
growth  rate  of  GVIO  in  constant  prices  as  given,  the  deflated  GVIO  is 
calculated therefore by multiplying the previous year’s GVIO in current price 
by the growth rate of GVIO.  
 
(2) Economic Efficiency Index: DEA analysis 
 
The actual calculation process of DEA efficiency index is conducted by EMS 
(Efficiency Management System) Version 1.3 developed by Scheel (1998). We 
did not distinguish scale efficiency and allowed for super efficiency.  
 
The average efficiency index and the market share weighted average efficiency 
index are presented in Fig. 7.  We can see that between 1987 and 1990, there is 
a slight increase in average efficiency index.  However, from 1990 onwards, 
there is a general tendency of widening gap between the best practising firms 
and the majority of the firms, as DEA estimates the comparative efficiency. The 
average  efficiency  index  has  decreased  from  58.36%  in  1990  to  34.67%  in 
1996. The fact that market share weighted average efficiency index lies above 
the simple average efficiency index indicates that larger firms tend to be more 
efficient. 
 










1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Average Weighted
 
When we compare average efficiency index of different ownership forms, SOEs 
in average are the least efficient, with its average efficiency index below the   17
population average. The average efficiency index of foreign invested firms is 
more than 15% higher than that of SOEs, even though entered this dataset only 
after  1991.  COEs  also  show  higher  technical  efficiency,  however,  they  are 
dominated by foreign invested firms.  
 










1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
SOE COE Other Foreign
 
 
This widening efficiency gap might have been caused on one hand by the entry 
of new firms, and on the other by the inability for inefficient firms to exit. 
Taking into account the dynamic feature of the dataset, the average efficiency 
indexes of incumbent firms, new entries
2 and exits
3 are calculated. Figure 9 
shows  that  new  entries  are  indeed  more  efficient  than  incumbent  firms  on 
average, exits are less efficient than incumbent firms. These imply that this 
increasing  efficiency  gap  should  be  studied  endogenously  rather  than 
exogenously.   
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(2) Productivity Growth: Malmquist Index 
 
In this section, we try to estimate and decompose the productivity growth by 
calculating enterprises’  Malmquist  Index.  Due to  the unbalanced feature  the 
data set, the Malmquist Index can only be calculated for firms surviving the two 
continuous years. The calculation is also done by EMS. The results of average 
Malmquist indexes are shown in Figure 10.   
 







1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Total SOEs COEs
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Except in 1989 and 1990, the Malmquist Index has been increasing, although 
the average Malmquist index has been fluctuating. And for the 10-year period, 
the annual average growth of productivity is 2.1%. In terms of ownership, it 
shows a similar picture as that of efficiency index. COEs in this aspect again 
outperform SOEs. And the Malmquist Productivity Index seems to be correlated 
with the growth of Gross Industrial Output.  
 
By decomposing the Malmquist index into the efficiency catch up effect and the 
technology  catch  up effect,  we  can  see that the  contribution to productivity 
improvement  orienting  from  technical  change  seems  to  dominate  the 
contribution from efficiency improvement in most years especially after 1991, 
indicating that the productivity growth comes mainly from technical progress 
rather than from efficiency improvement.  
 
















(3) The Features of the Frontier Firms 
 
With a panel dataset, it is of interest to study the stability of the efficient units. 
It strengthens the reliability of the approach if the same units appear on the 
frontier over time. It is also of importance to investigate the features of firms on 
the production frontier and the churning of firms on the frontiers in the context 
of China’s economic reform. Table 4 shows the re-occurrence of some of the 
frontier units and the occurrence of new entries on the frontier. Before 1993, the 
frontier units are relatively stable. For example, 40% of the frontier units in 
1987 were still on the frontier in 1992, and 50% of the frontier units in 1988   20
were still on the frontier in 1992. However, after 1992, the churning of frontier 
units accelerated. For example only 2 of the 19 frontier units in 1992 were still 
on the frontier in 1996.  
 
Another significant feature need to be noted is the extent of the occurrence of 
new entries on the frontier. In fact, more than half of the frontier units entered 
into the sample in the previous three years.  For example, of the 21 frontier units 
in 1990, 9 of them entered the dataset in the past three years; and of the 17 
frontier units in 1996, 11 of them entered the dataset only in the past three 
years.  
 
Table  4:  The  Stability  of  Frontier  Firms  (the  reoccurrence  of  the 
frontier units) and The Occurrence of New Entries on the Frontier  
  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
1987  10  7  6  6  3  4  1  0  0  1 
1988  (3)  12  10  8  4  6  2  1  1  2 
1989  (5)  (4)  16  9  5  6  2  1  1  2 
1990  (9)  (6)  (4)  21  9  7  4  2  1  2 
1991    (10)  (8)  (4)  17  10  4  3  2  1 
1992      (9)  (7)  (4)  19  5  4  1  2 
1993        (11)  (8)  (5)  23  5  3  1 
1994          (15)  (10)  (3)  25  4  3 
1995            (7)  (4)  (4)  12  4 
1996              (11)  (10)  (4)  17 
Note: the numbers inside the brackets are the number of frontier units in year  x but 
do not exist in year y , where xis row, and  y  is column.  
 
Although, they might not on the frontier anymore in the following years, the 
former  frontier  firms  tend  to  have  far  higher  efficiency  scores  than  the 
population average (See table 5). For example, the average efficiency index of 
year 1987 frontier firms in 1996 is nearly twice as high as that of the population 
average, and the average efficiency index of year 1992 frontier units in 1996 is 
2.2 times as high as that of the population average.    21
 
Table 5: The Average Efficiency Score of Frontier Units (%) in the Following Years 
  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
1987 
Frontier  116.14  110.30  98.78  94.72  99.77  72.93  70.91  51.50  62.61 
1988 
Frontier    117.15  102.36  93.92  92.39  69.32  72.25  53.29  69.82 
1989 
Frontier      99.84  91.75  88.66  68.49  67.55  49.07  64.51 
1990 
Frontier        108.50  100.18  74.18  77.94  53.83  59.60 
1991 
Frontier          116.79  81.24  85.26  74.10  74.30 
1992 
Frontier            82.69  78.37  67.06  74.48 
1993 
Frontier              92.50  59.66  58.51 
1994 
Frontier                74.66  75.02 
1995 
Frontier                  82.28 
Average  53.83  48.73  58.36  54.62  50.67  47.28  46.10  34.59  34.67 
 
Examining the distribution of frontier units by ownership for the period between 
1987 and 1996 (See table 6),  
 
Table 6: The Distribution of Frontier Units by Ownership 
Year  SOE  COE  DPE  FOR  SHARE  Total 
1987  10          10 
1988  12          12 
1989  14  2        16 
1990  18  2    1    21 
1991  11  4    2    17 
1992  12  3    4    19 
1993  7  6  2  5    20 
1994  8  7  1  7  2  25 
1995  2  5    5    12 
1996  3  3  2  8  1  17 
SOE:  State  Owned  Enterprises;  COE:  Collective  Owned  Enterprises;  DPE: 
Domestic Private Enterprises; FOR: Foreign Invested Firms; Share; Share Holding 
Companies 
 
We can see that at the beginning of the period, all of the frontier units were state 
owned. Since 1989, non-state owned enterprises began to occur on the frontier. 
Most significantly thereafter are the recede of SOEs from the frontier and the   22
occurrence of foreign invested firms (joint ventures and foreign owned) on the 
frontier. By 1996, of all 17 frontier units, only 3 are State owned, but 8 of them 
are foreign invested. The number of COEs on the frontier is on the increase as 
well, especially during the early 1990’s.  As such, we may argue that the newly 
entered firms such as COEs in 80’s, and the joint ventures in 90’s tend to bring 
into  the  product  markets  new  technologies  or  new governance  mechanisms, 
which make them more efficient then their counterparts in state sectors. This 
result  is  contrary  to  what  Jefferson  et  al.’s  (1999)  idea  of  SOEs  lead  in 
innovations, and others follow, in some sense, it can give evidence to support 
the opposite.  
 
5.  Economic Efficiency, Ownership, Competition and Internal Incentive: 
A Panel Data Analysis 
 
Why firms’ efficiency are different, in particular why SOEs are less efficient, 
what are the effects of economic reform and increasing market competition on 
firms’ efficiency?  Using a panel data analysis, this section tries to answer these 
questions  by  estimating  what  determines  firms’  efficiency  in  the  Chinese 
context. 
  
(1) Determinants of Enterprise Efficiency 
 
According  to  the  theories  of  the  firm,  firm’s  inefficiency  arise  due  to  the 
separation  of  ownership  and  control.  As  firm’s  ownership  and  control  are 
separated, there exists the agency problem, managers tending to pursue their 
own goals at the expense of those of shareholders (Edlin and Stiglitz, 1995; 
Williamson, 1964; Holmstrom et al., 1986). This agency problem cannot be 
dealt with through a complete contract that can be monitored without cost (Hart, 
1995; Mayer, 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). To induce firms’ managers to 
maximize profitability and to make the firm more efficient, the principal can 
provide incentives to managers, making their pay depending on the observed 
cost (Lafont and Tirole, 1986), therefore firms’ efficiency can be improved by 
giving managers stronger incentives, or shortening the hierarchy.  
 
Competition  in  capital  market,  product  market  and  managerial  market  can 
reinforce the internal discipline based on performance contingence incentive 
contracts. Competitive markets and the ease of entry and exit are assumed to be 
able  to  reinforce  firm’s  internal  discipline  and  enhance  firm’s  performance 
(Vickers, 1995; Nickell, 1996). There are two ways that competition may affect 
the  behaviour  of  firms.  The  first  effect  is  described  by  Vickers  (1995)  and 
Nickell (1996) as “discovery and selection”, in which a low cost entrant will 
generate  “disturbance’  to  the  market  equilibrium  and  may  drive  high  cost   23
incumbent  exit.  The  second  effect  of  competition  is  to  sharpen  managers’ 
incentives.  It  is  argued  that  both  manager’s  explicit  incentives  and  implicit 
incentives  will  be  improved  as  the  number  of  competitors  increase  
(Holmstrom,  1982;  Nalebuff  and  Stiglitz,  1983;  Hart,  1983;  Nickell,  1995). 
Besides, in a competitive managerial market, competition help to reveal the true 
ability  of  managers,  and  the  concern  for  a  future  career  induces  efficient 
managerial behaviours (Fama, 1980; Holmstrom, 1999). The existence of the 
threat of ‘take over’ in the capital market also acts as an incentive mechanism 
that deters management from the pursuit of policies that are substantially at 
variance with the interests of its shareholders (Yarrow and Vickers, 1988; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Grossman and Hart, 1980). 
 
As such the differences in firms’ efficiency can be attributed to the difference in 
the efforts of workers and managers, the organisation structure of production 
and  the  use  of  innovations,  what  Nickell  termed  as  ‘technology’,  and  the 
differences in market conditions, including product market competition, market 
for  corporate  control  and  financial  discipline  (Nickell,  1997).    In  addition, 
firm’s size is also associated with firm’s efficiency (Hopenhayn, 1992). 
 
(2) Determinants of Efficiency in Chinese Enterprises 
 
Based on the above theoretical background and bearing in mind the debates on 
Chinese  enterprise  performance,  we  will  discuss  the  effects  of  ownership, 
market competition, and financial discipline upon enterprise efficiency in the 




Chinese enterprises typically have five different ownership forms: State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs), Collective Owned Enterprises (COEs), Share ownership, 
Domestic  Private  Owned  Enterprises,  China-Foreign  Joint  Ventures  and 
Foreign Private Owned Enterprises. SOEs are argued to be less efficient due to 
its  SOE’s  social  obligation  other  than  profit  maximization,  government 
intervention, and the resulting soft budget constraints (Kornai, ; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1990; Yarrow and Vickers, 1988). COEs are often assumed to be more 
efficiently than their state counterparts due to greater autonomy, harder budget 
constraints, and probably their cooperative spirits (Weitzman and Xu, 1994; 
Roland, 2000; Li. D., 1996).  
 
Private  ownership  is  considered  more  independent  from  government 
intervention  and  more  profit  maximization  oriented,  and  be  more  efficient   24
consequently  (Yarrow  and  Vickers,  1988).    However,  the  positive  effect  of 
privatisation is not conclusive yet even in western economy (Laffont and Tirole, 
1995). And the relationship between ownership and enterprise performance is 
not clear either in transition economies (compare, for example, conclusions in 




Without  changing  ownership,  China’s  enterprise  reform  has  significantly 
expanded  SOE’s  contractual  profit  sharing  rights  and  managerial  autonomy. 
The retained profit can be used for R&D, employee’s wage and bonus, all of 
which are supposed to lead to efficiency improvement. We use the ratio of the 
retained profit to sale revenue to capture this incentive effect.  
 
But,  as  SOE’s  managerial  autonomy  having  been  expanded,  SOE  managers 
have more managerial discretion and face less monitoring, which consequently 
lead  to  the  so  called  “insider  control”  (Aoki,  1995),  SOE  insiders  pursuing 
objectives other than profit maximization, such as income appropriating and 
asset stripping, which is easier than improving SOEs’ efficiency. Under such a 
condition,  SOEs  managers  have  little  incentives  to  resist  workers’  wage 
demands. Therefore we use the wages and bonus in excess of industrial average 
as a measure of the degree of ‘insider control’.  
 
Market Competition  
 
Since the start of economic reform in 1978, enterprises in China began to face 
increasing  competition  pressure  coming  from  both  SOEs  and  non-SOEs. 
However, enterprises in different sectors are not exposed to the same degree of 
competition. Market mechanisms were first introduced into sectors that were of 
no strategic importance and sectors where state owned enterprises only account 
for  a  comparatively  smaller  fraction  of  sector  outputs.  As  a  result,  while 
consumer goods industries now have relatively lower concentration of SOEs 
and stronger market competition, investment good industries are still under high 
level  of  government  control.  Furthermore,  while  the  entry  of  new  non-state 
owned firms are encouraged, another perspective of competition pressure, the 
exit of non-performing SOEs, is still lagging behind due to various social and 
economic  concerns,  which  consequently  weaken  the  threat  coming  from 
takeover and exit.  
 
The  usual  practice  of  measuring  the  degree  of  market  competition  in  the 
literature is to proxy the market competition using an index of concentration.   25
The  most  popular  measures  of  them  are  concentration  ratio  and  Herfindahl 
Index.  However,  market  competition  is  difficult  to  determine  with  any 
precision, and cannot be completely captured by just one variable. To avoid the 
problems thus created, we have used 4 measures of market competition: the four 
largest firm market concentration ratios (CR4), the number of competitors (the 
number of large and medium enterprises in three-digit industrial sector), the 
number of new entries in the three digit industrial sector, and firm’s capital 
Intensity as a barrier to entry and exit.  
 
As we look at the output share of the four largest firms (CR4) in the two-digit 
sectors as an indicator of the market competition, we can see that over the ten 
years  the  ratio  has  been  staying  stable  in  most  sectors,  which  however  has 
concealed  a  significant  industrial  dynamics.  We  expect  to  see  competition 




Soft Budget Constraints has been charged for the enterprise inefficiency under 
socialist system and consequently its collapse (Maskin and Xu, 1999; Kornai, 
1980). Hardening budget constraint has been one of the objectives of China’s 
enterprise reform.  Whether Soft Budget Constraints still exist during the reform 
era and its effect upon enterprise efficiency is another our concern. It is argued 
that in China SOEs’ budgets are still soft due to their easy access to bank loan, 
government  subsidizes,  and  the  concern  of  political  and  social  stability 
associated with bankruptcy (Lin and Tan, 1999).  
 
As the State direct finance has been reduced, bank loan has become SOEs’ main 
source  of  finance  for  Chinese  firms.  However,  bank  loans  in  China  are 
considered soft, and become another form of soft budget constraint. Taxation 
arrear and intra-firm arrears have come out as some other forms of soft budget 
constraints.  Soft  bank  loans  and  intra-firm  arrears  arguably  increase  the 
possibility of not being bail out. Compared with SOEs, Non-state enterprises, 
especially private owned enterprises have to face harder budget constraints. The 
consequence  of  the  harder  budget  constraint  is  that  activities  of  Non-state 
owned enterprises are more market-oriented, because they have to make profit 
to survive.  
 
Here, the ratio of net interest expenditure to revenue is used as an indicator of 
firm’s financial discipline. For the period after 1992, debt asset ratio is also 
available to capture the gearing effect of capital structure. As for the effect of 
soft budget constraint, for the period before 1993, there are data on profit and   26
tax should have been submitted to the government and the data on profit and tax 
have been submitted, the difference of these two values can be a proxy of the 
indirect  soft  budget  constraints.  For  the  same  period,  my  data  also  have 
information  on  intra-firm  arrears,  which  is  another  form  of  soft  budget 




Our  last  concern  is  SOEs’  historical  legacies  and  the  reform  costs  bore  by 
SOEs,  and  their  effect  upon  SOEs’  efficiency.  It  is  argued  that  SOEs  have 
inherited from the socialist system far more social responsibilities than their 
non-state counterparts have, such as social security, medical care and housing, 
etc.  As the lifelong employment policy has been gradually broken since reform, 
SOEs  also  face  large  pension  and  insurance  entitlement.  As  SOEs’  social 
burden to a large extend expressed in the form of unproductive asset, such as 
hospital, school, etc., therefore we use the ratio of unproductive fixed asset ratio 
as a proxy of SOEs’ social obligations.   
  
 
(3)  Empirical Result   
 
In estimating the impact of economic reform, ownership, market competition, 
financial  discipline,  and  socialist  legacy  upon  productive  efficiency,  a 
regression  model  with  unbalanced  one-way  error  component  disturbances  is 
estimated. We base our model on a production function:    
 
) ( it it it X f y a =  
and     
 
where  ) ( it X f  is linear combination of  it X , and is firm i’s production frontier at 
time  t,  t i, a   represents  firm  i’s  efficiency  at  time  t,  t i z ,   is    a  vector  of 
explanatory  variables,    and  ) , 0 ( ~
2
u i IIN u s is  firm  specific  factor  and 
independent  of  ) , 0 ( ~
2
v it IIN e s .  We  don’t  have  time  specific  variables,  as 
efficiency index is estimated against the concurrent envelopment frontier. 
 
Following our discussion in the last section, the explanatory variables to be 
included in the regression are shown in table below: 
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Table 7: Explanatory Variables 
Ownership 
COE  Collective Owned Enterprises, dummy variable 
Foreign   Foreign Funded Enterprises (joint ventures and private owned) 
Other   Firms other than SOEs, COEs and Foreign 
Internal Incentives  
Retain  the ratio of retained profit to revenue 
retain93  interaction of retain and P93 
lnpcwage  Logarithms of wages per employee 
dpcwage  Deviation of the average wage per employee from industrial median 
lnpcbonus  Logarithms of bonus per employee 
dpcbonus  Deviation  of  the  average  bonus  per  employee  from  industrial 
median  
Market Competition 
CR4  defined as the output ratio of the four largest enterprises in 2-digit 
industry in the region 
numfirm  Number of firms in 2-digit industry 
numnew  the number of new firms  
dpcasset  Deviation  of  firm’s  asset  labour  ratio  from  that  of  minimum 
efficient size 
markets  Firm’s market share, defined as firm’s share of sales in the market. 
Financial Discipline 
interest  the ratio of interest expenditure to revenue 
interest93  the interaction of interest with P93 
arrear  the ratio of tax arrear to revenue 
subsidy  the ratio of government direct subsidy to revenue 
debtrate  The debt asset ratio 
Socialist Legacy 
upasset  the ratio of unproductive to productive asset 
Dummy variable 
P93  P93=1 if year>1992, otherwise p93=0 to capture the acceleration of 
reform since 1993. 
 
In order to make full use of the available data (as data on taxation arrear are 
only available before 1993, and data on debt and government subsidy can only 
be found since 1993), four models have been estimated using one-way error 
component method for unbalanced panels. The results from the experimental 
estimations are reported in Table 4. Column 1 is applied to data between 1987 
and 1992, Column 2 is applied to data between 1993 and 1996. Column 3,4,5, 6 
are applied to full sample period.       28
 
Table 8: Efficiency and Efficiency Determinants: Fixed Effects vs. Random Effect 
  Pre-1993  After 1993   Full Sample  Full  Sample  with 
Interactive Term 
  Fixed  Random Fixed  Random Fixed  Random Fixed  Random 
  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef. 
Firm’s Ownership 
coe  -0.010  0.022**  0.001  0.052***  0.018  0.045***  0.019  0.047*** 
Fore      -0.051  0.070***  0.109  0.113***  0.112  0.111*** 
others  -0.060**  -0.007  0.001  0.030***  -0.047***  -0.006  -0.046***  -0.005 
Internal Incentives 
retain  0.282***  0.376***  0.000  0.000  0.000***  0.000  0.327***  0.510*** 
retain93              -0.327***  -0.511*** 
lnpcwage  0.190***  0.183***  -0.170***  -0.080*** -0.103***  -0.155*** -0.097***  -0.145*** 
dpwage  -0.036*** -0.012  0.155***  0.141***  0.069***  0.102***  0.066***  0.096*** 
lnpcbonus  -0.014*** -0.017*** 0.036***  0.015  0.035***  0.042***  0.034***  0.041*** 
dpbonus  0.000*  0.000*  -0.009***  -0.008*** -0.002***  -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.002*** 
Market Competition 
markets  0.003***  0.002***  0.003***  0.003***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001*** 
numfirm  0.001***  0.000**  -0.160***  -0.083*** -0.192***  -0.092*** -0.196***  -0.093*** 
cr4  0.039  0.039*  -0.001***  0.000***  -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.001*** 
numnew  -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003***  -0.003*** -0.002***  -0.001*** -0.002***  -0.002*** 
lnpcasset  -0.090*** -0.030*** -0.134***  -0.059*** -0.130***  -0.072*** -0.129***  -0.071*** 
dpasset  0.015***  0.006***  0.011***  0.007***  0.012***  0.009***  0.012***  0.008*** 
Socialist legacy and Financial Discipline 
upasset  0.017  -0.018  -0.012  -0.088*** -0.046***  -0.089*** -0.046***  -0.090*** 
interest  -0.789*** -0.642*** -0.003*  -0.005*** -0.005***  -0.007*** 0.001  -0.010 
interest93              -0.006  0.003 
arrear  -0.137*** -0.101**             
debtrati      -0.001***  -0.001***        
subsidy      -0.002***  -0.003***        
_cons  0.659***  0.517***  1.269***  0.888***  1.073***  0.908***  1.059***  0.888*** 
Statistics 
LR chi2    556.29    762.09    1629.37    1953.41 
F   52.65    62.72    145.24    137.33   
R
2  0.0812  0.1405  0.0317  0.2455  0.0678  0.0891  0.0753  0.1031 
Hausman  273.61  274.39  541.19  561.91 
Obs  5778  5778  5666  5666  11467  11467  11467  11467 
*** = significant at 1% 
**  = significant at 5% 
*   = significant at 10% 
 
We noticed that the Random effect estimators are superior to the fixed effect 
estimators, as they have considerably smaller standard errors, and the overall R-
squares are also bigger. However, both Hausman test and Breusch and pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier test have rejected random effect models, suggesting that 
the assumptions underlying the random effect models are not met. Therefore,   29
we  turn  to  Generalised  Estimating  Equations  (GEE)  approach  described  in 
Liang and Zeger (1996) for general linear model, under this approach standard 
errors do not hinge on the assumptions. The results are presented in Table 9.  
 
Table 9: Efficiency and Efficiency Determinants: GEE 
  Pre-1993  After 1993  Full Sample  Full Sample 
  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef. 
Ownership 
coe  0.0299**  0.0521***  0.0460***  0.0477*** 
fore    0.0665**  0.1030***  0.1014*** 
others  0.0070  0.0293***  -0.0039  -0.0032 
Internal Incentives 
retain  0.4146***   -0.0005  -0.0003  0.5460*** 
Retain93        -0.5463*** 
Lnpcwage  0.1929***  -0.0683*  -0.1595***  -0.1493*** 
dpwage  -0.0042  0.1349***  0.1052***  0.0997*** 
lnpcbonus  -0.0194***  0.0128  0.0422***  0.0420*** 
dpbonus  -0.0004  -0.0080***  -0.0024***  -0.0023*** 
Market Competition 
markets  0.0018***  0.0026***  0.0014  0.0013* 
numfirm  0.0002**  -0.0004***  -0.0009***  -0.0008*** 
cr4  0.0313  -0.0808***  -0.0827***  -0.0834*** 
numnew  -0.0041***  -0.0033***  -0.0015***  -0.0016*** 
lnpcasset  -0.0167*  -0.0567***  -0.0650***  -0.0641*** 
dpasset  0.0040  0.0070***  0.0079***  0.0078*** 
Financial Disciplines and Socialist Legacy 
interest  -0.6035***  -0.0047**  -0.0070**  -0.0185 
Interest93        0.0115 
arrear  -0.0848*       
debtrati    -0.0015***     
subsidy    -0.0034***     
upasset  -0.0383  -0.0920***  -0.0954***  -0.0960*** 
_cons  0.4738***  0.8661***  0.8847***  0.8643*** 
Statistics 
Wald Test  666.37  1052.59  1967.66  2042.62 
Obs  5778  5655  11467  11467 
*** = significant at 1% 
**   = significant at 5% 
*     = significant at 10% 
 
In fact, the results presented in Table 8 and 9 are similar. Evident from these 
regressions for the whole sample period are positively the effect of Collective 
ownership and higher average wage per worker, and negatively the effect of 
high concentration, the number of new entries, the higher than average bonus 
per worker, and the level of unproductive asset. Most interesting of them all is   30
the negative effect of concentration ratio (CR4) and the number of new entries 
(newfirm). I will discuss the results in more detail. 
 
(4) Interpretation  
 
(a) Ownership and Efficiency 
 
For the whole sample period between 1987 and 1996, the effect of non-state 
ownership  upon  efficiency  is  controversial.  While  COEs  have  always  been 
positively related to efficiency index as we have expected, the effects of foreign 
related firms and firms labelled others (including domestic private owned firms, 
shareholding companies, etc.) are not conclusive. For example, the coefficient 
of  foreign ownership  is  positive  in  model  (2),  but  not  significant,  and  only 
weakly  significant  and  positive  in  Model  (4)-(6).    Interestingly,  this  is 
contrasted to the conclusion we drew from section 4 that foreign firms and firms 
labelled others are more efficient than SOEs, which indicates that the efficiency 
advantages enjoyed by non-public firms (foreign invested, domestic private and 
shareholding firms) may not oriented from ownership structure. 
 
(b) Efficiency and competition  
 
All measures of competition, the number of competitors (numfirm), the number 
of new entry (newfirm), and the concentration ratio have significant negative 
effect  upon  firm’s  efficiency  for  the  period  after  1993.  And  the  effect  of 
newfirm was significantly negative as well for the period between 1987 and 
1992,  while  the  effect  of  CR4  was  negative  but  not  significant.    All  these 
suggest  that  competition  increase  the  efficiency  gap,  and  firms  in  more 
concentrated  sectors  lagged  further  behind.  However,  in  an  effective 
competition environment, firms’ profit maximising behaviour and the pressure 
to survive will lead firm’s efficiency to an equilibrium level.  
 
One possible reason for the Chinese puzzle is that there are strong exit barrier 
within  China’s  markets,  as  new  firms  are  relatively  easier  to  enter,  the 
inefficient ones are difficult or not bother to exit.  As such with the entry of 
more  efficient  firms,  the  disparity  efficiency  between  frontier  firms  and 
majority firms becomes larger. This aspect of the market competition will not 
be discussed in this paper in detail.  
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(c) Efficiency and Internal Incentives  
 
The effect of incentive measures has also been significant for the whole sample 
period. The regression results suggest that at the initial stage of reform, the 
profit  retention  does  have  a  significant  positive  effect  upon  efficiency. 
However, its positive effect seems to fade away. For example, the coefficient of 
RETAIN in model (1) is 0.53, and is only 0.053 in model (2). By incorporating 
an interaction variable of retain and P93, we find that the effect of retain93 is 
significantly negative. Average wage per worker, another indicator of incentive 
mechanism, are positively correlated with efficiency index over the two periods. 
Interestingly incentive effect of excess bonus has been significantly negative for 
the two periods, which indicates the existence of insider control, under which 
SOEs  managers  distribute  excessive  bonus  rather  than  wages  to  workers, 
probably  because  the  level  of  wage  were  more  closely  regulated  by  the 
government.     
 
(d) Efficiency and Financial Discipline 
 
Regression  results  do  show  that  firms  respond  positively  to  the  gradually 
hardened  budget  constraints.    However,  even  20  years  into  the  reform,  soft 
budget constraints still persist. As a proxy of inexplicit government subsidy, 
enterprise’s tax arrears are negatively associated with efficiency index for 1987-
1992.  Government’s  direct  subsidy  is  negatively  associated  with  efficiency 
index  as  well  for  1993  to  1996.  However,  another  form  of  soft  budget 
constraint, intra firm arrears, has positive effect upon firm’s efficiency. This can 
be  explained  as  the  effect  of  firms  trying  to  get  round  of  the  hard  budget 
constraint imposed by the government as the result of economic reform.  
 
6.  Whether Firms’ Efficiency Gap Are Persistent: A Dynamic Panel Data 
Analysis 
 
The above regressions have emphasized the static relationship between firms’ 
efficiency and the determinants of firms’ efficiency.  However, it inadequately 
addresses how firms response to the dynamic competition, such as the intense 
competition between large firms despite the high concentration ratio, the entry 
of new firms, etc., and some other dynamic firm characteristics, such as the 
change of ownership, etc. Such dynamic characteristics may be better captured 
by examining the persistence of firms’ efficiency gap with technology frontier. 
 
If competition is intense and the market selection process is effective, there is 
likely to be a convergence in the efficiency of competing firms.  As firms strive   32
to  catch  up  with  technology  frontier  to  improve  efficiency  in  order  to  be 
profitable  and  to  survive.  Those  lagging  behind  will  be  sorted  out.  If 
competition is intense, but the market selection process is not effective, there is 
likely to be divergence in firms’ efficiency. As inefficient firms do not exit, 
which provides disincentives for firms to improve efficiency, at the same time 
new firms enter which drive forward the technology frontier.  With less intense 
competition, efficiency differences between firms may be more persistent. 
 
This  is  essentially  Schumpetarian  perspective  on  the  competition  process. 
Similar to Glen et al. (2003)’s account of corporate profitability and dynamic 
competition, the above process is estimated based on the following first-order 
auto-regressive equation: 
 
it t i i i it U + + = -1 , b l g b  
 
 where  it b  is defined as the gap between the efficiency of firm  iin time  t and 
the technology frontier,  i g  and  i l  are the parameters to be estimated, and  it U  is 
error term. The coefficient  i l  is interpreted as the speed of catch up with the 
technology advance (technology frontier), if  ) 1 , 1 (- Î i l , the equilibrium level of 
efficiency gap will be: 
 
) 1 /( i i iLR l g l - =  
 
Geroski (1990) suggests that this equation can be regarded as a reduced form of 
a more elaborate structural model involving entry, threatened entry and exit of 
firms, however it does not differentiate between different sources of efficiency 
gap persistency.   
 
In order to account for the different sources of efficiency gap persistency, the 











where  i g   is  a  firm  specific  random  effect,  it x   is  a  vector  of  covariates 
determining firm’s , and  it e  is an error term. This equation is estimated via the 
Arellane-Bond estimator.  
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We report below estimation results from 4 model specifications: model 1 and 2 
include one year lag, model 3 and 4 include 2 year lag. Model 2 and 4 include 
interactive terms  
 
Table 10: Persistence of Firm Efficiency Gap: A Dynamic Panel Data Study 
  1 year lag  1 year lag with 
interactive term  2 year lag  2 year lag with 
interactive term 
  Coef.  P>z  Coef.  P>z  Coef.  P>z  Coef.  P>z 
nscore(-1) 0.309***  0.00  0.314***  0.00  0.336***  0.00  0.348***  0.00 
nscore(-2)          0.072***  0.00  0.077***  0.00 
Ownership 
soe93      0.029***  0.00      0.034***  0.00 
coe  -0.018  0.50  -0.001  0.97  -0.004  0.89  0.000  1.00 
coe93      0.014  0.48      0.034  0.11 
fore  0.062  0.66  0.061  0.76  0.042  0.75  0.083  0.53 
dome  0.038  0.22  -0.014  0.85  0.047  0.13  0.044  0.63 
dome93      0.083  0.29      0.021  0.83 
share  -0.015  0.59  0.013  0.65  -0.020  0.47  0.010  0.72 
venture  0.013  0.72  0.074  0.21  0.017  0.67  0.018  0.80 
venture93      -0.050  0.37      0.030  0.65 
owncha1  0.004  0.77  0.001  0.94  0.007  0.64  0.006  0.70 
Internal Incentives 
retain  -0.158**  0.05  -0.164**  0.04  -0.205**  0.02  -0.187**  0.04 
retain93  0.158**  0.05  0.165**  0.04  0.205**  0.02  0.188**  0.04 
lnpcwage  0.141***  0.00  0.123***  0.00  0.105***  0.01  0.085**  0.04 
dpwage  -0.057***  0.00  -0.056***  0.00  -0.054**  0.03  -0.050**  0.04 
lnpcbonus -0.054***  0.00  -0.049***  0.00  -0.042***  0.00  -0.038***  0.00 
dpbonus  0.003**  0.03  0.003**  0.03  0.002  0.31  0.002  0.36 
Market Competition 
markets  -0.004***  0.00  -0.004***  0.00  -0.004***  0.00  -0.004***  0.00 
lnmes  0.090***  0.00  0.079***  0.00  0.082***  0.00  0.072***  0.00 
numnew  0.004***  0.00  0.004***  0.00  0.004***  0.00  0.005***  0.00 
numnewl  -0.001***  0.00  -0.001***  0.00  -0.001**  0.03  -0.001***  0.00 
dpcasset  -0.006***  0.00  -0.006***  0.00  -0.005***  0.00  -0.005***  0.00 
Socialist Legacy and Financial Discipline 
passet  -0.044***  0.00  -0.043***  0.00  -0.062***  0.00  -0.062***  0.00 
interest  0.003  0.36  0.004  0.28  0.004  0.30  0.005  0.21 
_cons  0.005*  0.07  0.004  0.18  0.006**  0.03  0.004  0.22 
*** = significant at 1% 
**  = signiicant at 5% 
*   = significant at 10% 
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The Variables included in the regression is explained in Table 11: 
 
Table 11: Explanatory Variables for Persistence of Efficiency gap 
nscore(-1)  firm's efficiency gap to technology frontier in year-1 
nscore(-2)  firm's efficiency gap to technology frontier in year-2 
Ownership 
soe93  interactive term of SOE and P93 
COE  Collective Owned Enterprises, dummy variable 
coe93  interactive term of COE and P93 
Foreign   Foreign Funded Enterprises (joint ventures and private owned) 
dome  Domestic private enterprises 
dome93  interactive term of Dome and P93 
share  Shareholding companies 
venture  domestic joint ventures  
venture93  Interactive term of Venture and P93 
owncha1  ownership  change,  towards  private  ownership  =1,  towards  state 
ownership =-1 
Internal Incentives 
Retain  the ratio of retained profit to revenue 
Retain93  interaction of retain and P92 
lnpcwage  Logarithms of wages per employee 
dpcwage  Deviation of the average wage per employee from industrial median 
lnpcbonus  Logarithms of bonus per employee 
dpcbonus  Deviation of the average bonus per employee from industrial median  
Market Competition 
markets  Firm’s market share, defined as firm’s share of sales in the market. 
lnmes  logaritham of minimum efficient scale in three digit industrial sector. 
numfirm  Number of firms in 2-digit industry 
numnew  the number of new firms  
numnewl  The number of new firms in year-1 
dpcasset  Deviation of firm’s asset labour ratio from that of minimum efficient 
scale 
Socialist Legacy and Financial Discipline 
passet  the ratio of productive to productive asset 
interest  the ratio of interest expenditure to revenue 
 
The results indicates first, that firm’s efficiency gap to the technology frontier is 
not persistent. As the value of  2 1 l l +  is in the range of [0.3,0.45], implying that 
the gap will dissipate within 3 years.  
 
Second, Non-state firms’ speed to catch up with technology frontier seems to be 
not  statistically  different  from  that  of  SOEs,  as  none  of  the  coefficients  on 
ownership related variables are statistically significant. This is especially true   35
for COEs. This implies that firms regardless of ownership respond similarly to 
the competitive pressure, and firms’ efficiency difference may result from their 
historical legacy.  However, after 1992, SOEs seems to be slower in catching 
up.  
 
Third,  the  effect  of  internal  incentives  is  complicated.  The  profit  retention 
program initially serves to encourage firms to catch up technology frontier (the 
coefficient for retain is negative), however after 1992, this effect turns to be 
around zero. Higher wages tend to increase firms’ efficiency gap to technology 
frontier; however if it is higher than industrial average, the opposite is true.  
Higher bonus tends to help firms to catch up; yet, if it is higher than industrial 
average, then the opposite applies.  
 
Fourth, firms with bigger market share and higher capital intensity tend to catch 
up  the  technology  quickly.  While  firms  in  sectors  with  more  new  entries 
increased their efficiency gap with technology frontier, as is indicated by the 
statistically significant positive coefficient of numnew, they seems to learn from 
the new entries, as is indicated by the negative coefficient of numnewl, however 
this learning effect is much weaker than that of the lagging effect, indicating 
that the entry threat effect is not that effective. The results also suggest that 
firms  in  sectors  with  higher  minimum  efficient  scale  tend  to  increase  their 
efficiency gap with technology frontier.   
 
Fifth,  firms  with  less  socialist  legacy  tend  to  catch  up  with  the  technology 
frontier quicker. Yet, the effect of finical discipline is not significant.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we applied DEA technique to estimate enterprise efficiency and 
productivity change in the context of Chinese large and  medium enterprises 
during  the  period  between  1987  and  1996.  Contrasted  to  the  results  of 
improving enterprise performance measured by TFP from other studies, we find 
that there is a general tendency of divergence of enterprise efficiency rather 
than  a  convergence  of  firm’s  efficiency  as  is  expected  from  a  competitive 
market.  
 
By estimating firms’ static efficiency and firms’ dynamic progress to catch up 
with technology frontier, it suggests that the effect of ownership upon firm’s 
static efficiency is not conclusive. While COEs s are generally more efficient 
and more productive that SOEs, the ownership effect of foreign ownership, and 
domestic  private  ownership  are  not  clear.  However,  firms  of  different   36
ownership types seem to respond similarly to catch up with technology frontier. 
These suggest that firms’ efficiency difference might result from their different 
historical trajectory and legacy. 
 
The analysis also suggest that profit retention program does have positive effect 
upon improving a firm’s efficiency at the initial stage of reform, this positive 
effect phase out in later stage reform. As for performance wage and bonus, their 
effects are complicated and need to be designed properly to achieve a positive 
effect upon efficiency improvement.  
 
Market competition seems to be working, but ineffectively. As new firms enter 
driving up the technology frontier, incumbent firms are slow to respond. Hence, 
we suspected that the market competitive process is not working effectively. 





1 For example, when SOE’s performance is assessed by output level, manager’s 
objective  will  be  biased  toward  increasing  output,  and  deviate  further  from 
profit maximizing output level.  One such evidence in China is the high level of 
inventory. According to China Statistical Yearbook (2000), inventory build-up 
accounted for 6.1% of GDP on average between 1990 and 1997. 
2 As the firms in this dataset are large and medium enterprises, new entries are 
new to the dataset, as some of the new entries are previous small enterprises 
developing into medium enterprises. 












   37
References 
 
Aghion,  P.,  Jefferson,  G.,  et  (1999),  Evaluation  of  World  Bank  Research: 
Transition Economics, World bank. 
Ali, A.I. and Seiford, M.L (1993), “ The Mathematical Programming Approach 
To Efficiency Analysis Efficiency”, in Fried, H.O., C.A.K. Lovell and 
S.S. Schmidt (Eds), The Measurement of Productive Efficiency, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 121-159. 
Anderson,  P.  and  Peterson,  N.C.  (1993),  A  Procedure  for  ranking  Efficient 
Units in Data Envelopment Analysis, Management Sciences 1993, 39 
(10), 1261-1264. 
Aoki, M. (1995), “Controlling Insider Control: Issues of Corporate Governance 
in Transitional Economies," in Aoki, M., and Kim, H-K, Ed.- Corporate 
Governance in Transitional Economies: Insider Control and the Role of 
Banks, The World Bank, Washington, D.C, 1995, pp. 3-29. 
Banker, R. D. (1993), Maximum likelihood, consistency and Data Envelopment 
Analysis: a Statistical Foundation, Management Sciences 39 (10), 1265-
1273. 
Branstetter, Lee G. and Feenstra, Robert C (1999), Trade and Foreign Direct 
Investment in China: A Political Economy Approach, NBER Working 
Paper No.W7100, 1999. 
Caves, D., L.Christensen, and W.E.Diewert (1982), “ The Economic Theory of 
Index  Numbers  and  the  Measurement  of  Input,  Output,  and 
Productivity”, Econometrica 50(6): 1393-1414 
Caves,  R.  E.  and  D.  R.  Barton  (1990),  Technical  Efficiency  in  the  U.S. 
Manufacturing Industries, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Charners, A., W.W. Cooper and E. Rhodes (1978), “ Measuring the Efficiency 
of Decision Making Units”, European Journal of Operations Research, 
2, 429-444. 
Chong-en Bai, David D. Li, and Yijiang Wang (1997), “ Enterprise Productivity 
and Efficiency: When is Up Really Down?”, Journal of Comparative 
Economics 24, 265-280. 
Debreu, G. (1951), The Coefficient of Resource Utilization, Econometrica 19 
(3), 273-292. 
Dong, Fureng (1994), “Foreword.” In Donald A. Hay, Derek J. Morris, Guy 
Liu,  and  Shujie  Yao,  Eds,  Economics  reform  and  State  Owned 
enterprises In China, 1979-1987, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 
Economist (1997), “Special: The Long March to Capitalism”, in Economist, 13
th 
Sep, 1997. 
Fare, R.  and  C.A.K. Lovell  (1978),  “Measuring  the  Technical  Efficiency of 
Production”, Journal of Economic Theory, 19, 150-162.   38
Farell, M.J. (1957) , “ The measurement of productive Efficiency”, Journal of 
the Royal Statistical Society, A CXX, Part 3, 253-290. 
Glen, J., K. Lee, et al. (2003). "Corporate Profitability and The Dynamics of 
Competition in Emerging Markets: A Times Analysis." Economic 
Journal 113: 465-484.  
Groves,  Theodore  et  al  (1994),  “Autonomy  and  Incentives  in  Chinese  State 
Enterprises”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109,1:183-209.  
Gordon,  R,  and  Li  Wei,  “The  change  in  productivity  of  Chinese  State 
Enterprises, 1983-1987”, Journal of Productivity Anal, 6, 5-26, 1995. 
Grosskopf, S.  (1993), “ Efficiency And productivity,”,  The Measurement of 
Productive Efficiency: Techniques and Applications (Harold O. Fried, 
C.A.Knox Lovell, Shelton S. Schmidt, etl)  
Grosskopf, S.  (1996), Statistical Inference and Nonparametric Efficiency: A 
Selective Survey, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 7, 161-176. 
Hay, Donald, D. Morris, G.S. Liu and S.Yao, 1994, Economic Reform and State 
Owned  enterprises  in  China:  1979-1987,  Oxford:  Oxford  University 
Press. 
Jefferson, Gary, H. (1989), Potential Sources of Productivity  Growth within 
Chinese Industry, World Development. 
Jefferson, G., Rawski, T., and Zheng, Y.X. (1992), “Growth, Efficiency, and 
Convergence  in  China’s  State  and  Collective  Industry”,  Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, 40(2): 239-166, 1992. 
Jefferson,  G.,  Rawski,  T.  and  Zheng,  Y.X.  (1996),  “  Chinese  Industrial 
Productivity: Trends, Measurement Issues, and Recent Development.” 
Journal of Comparative Economics 23, 2: 146-180, Oct. 1996. 
Jefferson, G., Rawski, T. and Zheng, Y.X. (1999), Innovation and Reform in 
China's  Industrial  Enterprises,  Jefferson  and  Singn  eds.  Enterprise 
reform in China: Ownership, transition, and performance, pp. 89-106  
Kneip, A., B.U. Park, and L. Simar (1998), A Note on the Convergence of 
Nonparametric  DEA  estimators  for  Production  Efficiency  Scores, 
Econometric Theory, 14, 783-793. 
Koopmans,  T.  C.  (1951),  An  Analysis  of  Production  as  an  Efficient 
Combination  of  Activities,  in  Activity  Analysis  of  Production  and 
Allocation, ed. By T. C. Koopmans, Cowles Commision for Research in 
Economics, Monograph 13, New York: John-Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
Kornai, Janos (1986), The Soft Budget Constraint, Kyklos, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 
3-30. 
Korostelev, A., L. Simar, and A.B. Tsybakov (1995a), Efficient Estimation of 
Monotone Boundaries, The Annals of Statistics, Vol. 23, pp. 476-489. 
Korostelev,  A.,  L.  Simar,  and  A.B.  Tsybakov  (1995b),  On  Estimation  of 
Monotone and Convex Boundaries,    39
Laffont,  Jean-Jaques  and  Tirole,  Jean  (1986),  Using  Cost  Observation  to 
Regulate Firms, Journal of Political Economy, 94: 614-41 
Leibenstein,  Harvey  (1966),  Allocative  Efficiency  Vs.  “  X-Efficiency”, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 56, No. 3, pp. 392-415 
Leibenstein,  Harvey,  and  Maital,  Shlomo  (1992),  Empirical  Estimation  and 
Partitioning  of  X-Inefficiency:  A  Data-Envelopment  Approach, 
American Economic Review, vol. 82, no. 2, pp. 428-33 
Li, David D. (1996), A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition 
Economies:  The  Case  of  the  Chinese  Non-State  Sector,  Journal  of 
Comparative Economics, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 1-19 
Li,  Wei  (1997),  The  Impact  of  Economic  Reform  on  the  Performance  of 
Chinese  State  Enterprises,  1980-1989,  Journal  of  Political  Economy, 
Vol. 105, pp.1080-1106. 
Liang,  K.  Y.,  and  Zeger,  S.  L.  (1986),  Longitudinal  Data  Analysis  using 
Generalized Linear Models, Biometrika, Vol. 73: pp.13-22. 
Lin, Justin Yifu, and Tan, Guofu (1999), Policy Burdens, Accountability, and 
the Soft Budget Constraint, American Economic Review, vol. 89, no. 2, 
May 1999, pp. 426-31 
Lovell,  C.A.K.  (1993),  “Production  Frontiers  and  Productive  Efficiency”,  in 
Fried, H.O., C.A.K. Lovell and S.S. Schmidt (Eds), The Measurement of 
Productive Efficiency, Oxford University Press, New York, 3-67 
Nickell,  S.  J.  (1996),  Competition  and  Corporate  Performance,  Journal  of 
Political Economy, Vol. 104, No.4, pp. 724-45. 
Rodden, Jonathan A. and Eskeland, Gunnar S. (2003), Fiscal Decentralization 
and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints, MIT Press 
Sachs,  J.D.  and  Woo,  W.T.(1997),  Understanding  China’s  Economic 
Performance, Development Discussion Paper No. 575, Harvard Institute 
for International Development, Harvard University. 
Scheel, Holger (2000), EMS: Efficiency Measurement System User’s Manual, 
http://www.wiso.uni-dortmund.de/lsfg/or/scheel/ems/ 
Seiford, L.M. (1996), “ Data Envelopment Analysis: The Evolution of the State 
of the Art (1978-1995)”, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 7, 99-138. 
Seiford, L.M. and R.M. Thrall (1990), “Recent Developments in DEA: The 
Mathematical Approach to Frontier Analysis”, Journal of Econometrics, 
46, 7-38. 
Simar,  L.  and  P.W.Wilson  (2000),  Statistical  Inference  in  Nonparametric 
frontier models: The State of the Art, Journal of Productivity Analysis 
13, 49-78. 
State  Statistical  Bureau,  China  Statistical  Yearbook,  1997,  Beijing,  China 
Statistical Publisher.   40
Vickers, J. S. (1995), Concepts of Competition, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 
47, No. 1, pp. 1-23. 
Weitzman, Martin L, and Xu, Chenggang (1994), Chinese Township-Village 
Enterprises as Vaguely Defined Cooperatives, Journal of Comparative 
Economics, vol. 18, no. 2, April 1994, pp. 121-45 
World  Bank  (1995),  China:  Macroeconomic  Stability  in  a  Decentralized 
Economy, Washington D.C. 
Zhu, Rongji (1996), “No time shall be lost in Further Reforming State Owned 
Enterprises”,  speech  at  the  Fourth  Meeting  of  the  Eighth  People’s 
Congress, People’s daily (Overseas Edition), March 11,1996 
 